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Tl\ll!.l" OF CO:,TI:N'J'S 
;; \TliHE OF ('f,S!·: 
HELlE!' SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
STATEr-cENT OF FACTS 
1\HGUHENT 
POINT I - THERE IS NO SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT 
TIIC COURT'S FINDING THAT THE $5,000 RECEIVED BY DEF-
ENDANT WAS AN INVESTNENT, \'IHILE THE EVIDENCE CLEARLY 
Pl\EPONDERI\TES TO THE CONTRARY THAT THE $5,000 WAS A 
LO:IN FHOM PLAINTIFF TO DEFENDANT. 
POINT II - WHERE THERE IS NO SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE TO 
SUPPORT THE COURT'S RULING, AND THE COURT'S FINDINGS 
1\RE CLEARLY AGAINST THE HEIGHT OF TilE EVIDENCE, THE 
JUDGMENT MUST BE REVERSED. 
CONCLUSION 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
JOSEPHS. GASSER JR., 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
STATE OF UTAH 
LYMAN DAYTON, 
Defendant-Respondent, 
Case No. 15394 
APPELLhNT'S BRIEF 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This action is based on an oral agreement whereby 
the plaintiff loaned $5,000.00 to the defendant on August 26, 
1969, which was to be repaid within one year of that date. 
Defendant failed to repay the $5,000.00, claiming thut it 
was not a loan, but a business investMent, the return of 
which was contingent upon the profitability of a current film 
\'enture. 
DISPOSITION IN LOPER COURT 
After a trial held before the district court sitting 
~ithout a jury, the court granted juCgment ln favor Jf the 
cit fcJtdanl of no cuuse of uction. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff seeks reversal of the Findings of Fact ar.: 
Conclusions of Law, and for reversal of the judc;ment against 
plaintiff of no cause of action; for judgment in favor of tl, 
plaintiff for the amount of $5,000.00 plus interest to da~. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The plaintiff was a resident of Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah, and the defendant was a resident of the State 
California and engaged in motion picture production during ( 
times material to this action. The p1a).nti ff and defendant 
became acquainted during the fall of 1969 through the defend: 
father-in-law. ('I'r. p. 3) In August of 1969 plaintiff trans£: 
$5,000.00 to the defendant (Tr.p.3) which the clefendanl ad~,i: 
receiving. (Tr.pp.l7-18) 
Plaintiff maintains that he loaned the $5,000.00 b 
defendant to help the defendant pay off his bu~in~ss debts~ 
his personal obligations, such as rent. (Tr. [Jp.3,4,5anc1lll 
According to the plaintiff the money \vJS to be rc;>aid ~<ithir 
one(l) year (Tr.p.4) along with a normal interest on the rno~ 
('rr. p. 5) On August 4, 1971, plaintiff sent a letter to defi· 
(R.p.23), introduced as Exhibit P-2 at trial, requesting rr; 
ment of the $5,000.00 loan. Defendant responded by letter 
August 16, 1971, and marked as Exhibit P-3 at trial, stati~ 
that he huped "foreign sales v:i.ll rtt'lkc it possible to crivc a 
remittance of thC' $',,000.00 dollarc; soorv-r." (F.p.2:') l'.•]Jl-
c1anuary 13, 
Exhibit P-4 
1972, p1air.tifr \·:rotc cleferccbnt i1 l0ttc>-, n.nY.c 
a~ trjol
1 
clr•Jr.tn\linq rC':t•,l:r'-''lt c.f "~[~,, $:-l,ooo.on 
I made to yec:." (P.['·~·;) 
-2-
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of thL· $'>,000.00 dollars ('i'r.r•p.5,9). 
Dcf<•t•r1ant cl<Lirns thett the $S, 000.00 he received from 
if the film made a profit (Tr. pp.l9,7.0). Also, if the fill~ 
~.: profitable, the plaintiff was to receive an additional 2t 
return on his money. ('l'r. p.20) Plaintiff denies having any 
interest in the film (Tr.p.S) and the defendant admits that 
the plaintiff \VilS given nothing to cvidcence any ownership in 
th::: film ('l'r.pp.32,33). 
ARGUHENT 
POINT I 
THERE IS NO SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE TO SUPPOP-.7 TilE 
COURT'S FINDING THAT THE $5,000 RECEIVr:D BY DEF-
ENDANT I~ AS l\N INVESTMENT, 1'/HILE THE EVIDEt\CE 
CLEJ\1\LY PREPONDERATES 'I'O THE CONTRARY 'l'II/1'1' THE 
$5,000 WAS l\ LOAN FRO~! PLAINTIFF TO DCFENDi,;~T. 
This Court adheres to the substantial evidence rule in 
rcvic1-1ing the· trial court's findings and rulings <::_cl11_n9..!:l._~!_i<Ih:t:, 
531 P.2cl 1290, Utah 2c1 ( 197 5) . 
In the case before this Court now, the record clearly 
inJicates no substantial evidence upon which the lower court's 
ruling can be approv,·d and upheld. 
The material evidence adduced at trial \veighs heavily 
1n plaintiff's favor. Only four exhibits 1-1ere introduced at 
trial and all were by the plaintiff. The first exhibit, marked 
P-1 at trial, was the check for $5,000.00. This check was sent 
tr, lhc dcfenclont in Californio Hhcre it \·:os enclol·sed by his ~life 
illc] clepo"i tcc1 in the ba 11 k where the defcnclaut had a personal 
ell'!~\) un t. 
Tlw secc,,~,cJ pi ecc of clocwcc•Jltacy evidence received at 
I· i.tl "" J:xhibil p-~2, \·:ac; a letter dated Au'Jusl 4, 1971 from the 
-3-
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J:n this letter the !'lui_ntiff asl;c 
rcp::ty the loan mud•• to him because' the plilint~ 
-,.;as in ilced of rnonc:· al that tim'". 
Dcfcndont responded to the plaintiff's letter of Aug'. 
!,, 1971 by a letter dateu August 16, 1971, which was introducec 
nt trial as plaintiff's Exhibit 3. In this letter the defendar,: 
':epl S.cs to plaintiff's request for repayment of the loaned mone; 
by s~ating that "I'm hoping that foreign sales will make it~~ 
ble to give a rerr.ittance of the $5,000.00 dollars sooner''. The 
defendant thereafter concluded the letter by saying, "The monieo 
yo'J sent came at a very crucial time and I appreciate that fact. 
I am. doing all I can to justify your confidence". This letter 
does not make payment conditibnal. In fact, it offers remittanc 
as soon a.s funds are available. Also, and more importantly, U: 
clr,•fendant does not deny or contradict plaintiff's statement tha: 
tte ~oney was a loan to the defendant. Surely he would have de:· 
iche money \·las a loan if it had been received for another purpoE· 
The last document introduced at trial was another l~ 
from the plaintiff to the defendant, dated January 13, 1972. lr• 
t.h":> plaintiff asks for repayment of "the $5,000.00 loan I made 
to you." (Exhibit P-4) 
The testimony received at trial can be fairly summan: 
by stating that the plaintiff testified that the money given~ 
the defendant was a loan to be repaid within a year, with the 
defendanl countering that it was an investment to be repaid oct 
of film profits, if any. Yet the defendant admits he gave t~ 
plaintiff no wri ttcn document to evidence lhis business invest' 
(Tr. p.32 lines 14-30 and p.33 lines l-5) 
-4-
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The above l istcc.l sequence of facts anc.l c1ocume 11 tar:y 
,cic·!lCL" CL!nnot Lc interpreted in any manner other th,m in support 
c,t plaintiff's cJairn thut the money was loaned to defendant. 
The only aspect of the documentary evidence ~1hich \vould 
tceik1 in any manner to support the defendant's contention that the 
Jo;,cy \vets given to him for investment purposes is a notation on 
t~ check which appears to be the letters inv. However, as can 
k seen from "exhibit A" attached to the Answer to Defendant's 
!il~rrogatories this notation does not appear on the check as 
cf r.ugust '26, 1967, which is the date the check bears. (R.p.2l) 
it ntust hL!ve been added to the check sometime after it was 
Further, the notation is written in pencil, and the 
Flaintiff has testified that it did not look like the letters 
'.nv t.c him, and that even if it was, he could not recall writing 
1~ on the cht?ck, and it was not his ct;·stom to make such a notation 
(Tr.p.l2 lines ~5-30 and p.l3 lin~s l-3) 
The plaintiff claims that the defendant told him t!Jat 
~~money was to be used for satisfying defendant's personal and 
business debts. (Tr. P.4 lines 17-21; Tr. P.ll lines 23-25) 
'l'hc defendant claims the money \·/as used in the business 
vnd applied to him personally as a salary. (Tr.P21 lines 3-8) 
This sho\vS that the money \Vas used partly for his personal expenses 
0 wuy of the salary distribution to him. This directly supports 
ll~ plaintiff's testimony that the money was to be used for business 
ilnrl pc,rsonctl obligations. 
At the trial's conclusion the court commented on the 
(·--i,: liL:c- and set-. forth the follm-ling summary of key evidentiary 
-5-
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[>ni,,t_, ('l'r. p. 3!; line:; 5-22): 
(l) "Thee chc·ck ha'~ the ~,·;orcl, lnv. on it, \vhich 
leads rnc to bee concerned about v:!tc;thcr or nc:t 
that's an investment;" 
(2) "but ln Exhibit P~-2 Hr. Cd~;cl:J 'c; lc·t lc•1_ 
to Mr. Dayton, he cl0es refer to it as a lo 3 n.' (3) "D11t in !-'r. Dayton's rec~ponc;c he d""" noL 
contracllct that." 
!<1) "Something else that bothers me> very n;uch 
ls, that t;1e check shO\·Is it was deposited by 
Mrs. Dayton a'ld l·:ould certainly give m0 the 
appearance that goes into a personal account 
rather than a business account, because I am 
assuming--! think Mr. Dayton did testify that 
he and his lvifc did have an account, a joint 
account, and that leaves some questions ~n my 
mind." 
Taking these comments together with the undisputed f,1 
t!E•.t the defendant received the money, there are four m'!ter.i.al 
ele~ents out of five that support and favor the plaintiff's 
cor.-Lentions. These clements are thilt the defendu.nt recci,:c.·cl 
$'::, 000.00 fror,1 pla:inL iff, plctintiff by letter u'~kecJ for rc•vry:· 
of t.his $5,000.00 bccuusc it was a loan, c1efC?ndilnf. djc1 not cor.: 
d:icl: or deny that. it 1-.'uS a loan in his letter rcsponscc to plai· 
t.i.f.['s dern;md for payment and, finally, the monc1 \·.'ctS ck-r,ositct'. 
a bank where the defendant and his 1vife h3cl a perscmu.l uccoul:, 
with l'lrs. Dayton, the defendnnt's wife, enclorsinr1 the clvcck. 
The only )JOSsible negative l"l<emE"nt of supportin') evi,' 
appearing at triul is that the check ltu.s in'l vnit.tell on it. 
· 'tt · '1 .".Onlr>tl.m" :1fter the chcci: ever, even thl~; v:as I•Jrl : en ln penc1 ~ - - , 
had been sent to the defendant. 
From tlH' above clement o;, it J,mst bee c]c•.n~ that th·-· 
cvi(1C>ncc greatly prcpondt.·ratcs in pl~rint-_iff's f avc>r. 
The oral evic1cJH'•' is corlll-l:(1 ictory, )ll'l·, fotJ( oul 
-c-
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!Jj: C'(~:-; <>f dn- L · 
-'-·u:ll--'11 :tl-'J t'Vld( l•\1...' f-lVO'J- ] · ·.ff' 
· ' - p. a l r 1 l 1 ~; Oldl 
iro!rljJY' (lltc1 t ])(· one· p i(~ce of eviclL·ncc unfavorable to plaintiff's 
'; L- i ()I l I:; lhcc ill\' noldlion on the check, v:h ich, al best, 
.. , •1 UJtc1rc'l:tiLi.c dn·:::l unconvincincJ piece of evidence. Surely not 
cT<ll.-Jl' to oul\·ICLrJh t.h0 CJrt'<ltcr quantum of evi·.~ncc favorable to 
lilc' pli!intifl. 
clear that the court has misapplied the proven 
and made findings against the weight of the evidence, and 
It. scern.s 
l hec;c illC sufficiC>nt qrounds for reversal. First Security Bank 
lSI (l%1). 
A proper finding by the court 1-1ould have been that the 
'.'_,,n[·:~.OO Wil:·; 0 loan froni plaintiff to defenJant, and the refusal 
t;, 1.1-d:cc this fincling .is also a ground for reversal. loovie f'i_lms, 
1 ( l'JG:; ). Further, \·,·here the appellate Court believes that no 
tri0r of fact, acting fairly and reasonably could refuse to make 
such a finding, such a failure 1~ill necessitate a reversal. Ray 
\'. C'l'l'~;olj._<J!=lt0Cl __ I2-:eig.b_tyays, 289 P.2d 196, 4 Utah 2d 137 (1955). 
The Supreme Court is not bound by a finding of the trial 
cnt~> t, even if such a finding is based upon the type of evidence 
l·:hiC'h I·Jould normally sustain the court's finding. The Court may 
rc .i· <:t such a finding if it is unreasonable or unsustainable by 
t).,. cvicl,ncC' 1.,;hcn vie\·Jed in light of all attendant circumstances. 
'ilcicc '''"; the CclSC' in Cont.incntal Bank & Trust Co. v. Stewart, 
i'' :·. /cl B'JO, 897, 4 Utah 7cl 153 (1955), ~;here the Court reversed 
L -7-
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a finding based on positive testimony where' J l · sue 1 cc;t 1 mony 1.100> 
given by a witness who had a vital personal interest in the 
controversy. 
See also, In Re 13ehm's Estate, 213 P.2cl 657, ll7 Utah 
151 (1950), in which the Court reversed a trial court decision 
where it had made a finding based upon an issue which had not 
been pled and where the evidence introduced at trial was not 
sufficient to support such a finding. The Court indicated t~t 
if an issue is neither pled nor supported by evidence a findino 
cannot be made or sustained in that trial. Even if an issue is 
properly pled, it must be supported by sufficient evidence, or 
a finding based thereon must be reversed. 
POINT II 
WHERE THERE IS NO SUGSTANTIAL EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT 
THE COURT'S RULINS, AND THE COURT'S FINDINGS ARE 
CLEARLY AGI\ItlST THE HEIGHT OF T!IE EVIDEt\CE, THE 
JUDGMENT MUST BE REVEFSED. 
The Supreme Court reviews the finclinqs and rulinss of 
the lower court undcr thc substantial evidcncc te~;t, <:_~_rro_11_~ 
Wright, __ :mpra, and where such findings arc not suppot·ted by 
substantial evidence they should be reversed by the Court. Se: 
Lowe v. Rosen1of, 364 P.2d 418, 12 UtE1h 2c1 190 (l9Gl). 
In the case of Q_'_Gara _ _\!_.____Fi_n_d]ay, 306 P.2d 1073, 
Utah 2d 102 (1957), thc Court stated th.>t it Houlcl not ovcrtc·· 
the trial court's findings unless thc trial court had misaprl~ 
f . d. l 1 · t th-· v:clqht o~ c· .. proven facts or D'ade ln lngs c car· y il'Jc::llnc-;- c 
dencc. 'I' he findings v:c rc !".uppor t eel u~· clncuc><•n t0 ry vv ic1cncc 
the uncontroverted test i;;1ony uf V,'i tnvc:~;c:o. 
1 ."• 1' r]» ('; f t ll>' .'• lj} ):-. 1- cl J 1 t l (;. l before this Court prc,:cnt'; tltc· Ol.l· r . 
-o-
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evidence coin. Here, the findings arc dirRctly opposed to the 
r''"Jori ty of the evidence, the documentary evidence refutes the 
findings and the testimony of the witnesses is in conflict. 
This case dictates a reversal because the circumstances 
r•ccessary to such a reversal are present and clearly persu'ls).ve. 
It follows necessarily that a finding which lacks any evidence 
to support it must be reversed. Dunlap v. Jeffrey, 260 P.2d 
1072 (1953); Lumbermans Mut. Cas. Co. v. Iowa Home Mut. C~s Co., 
405 P.2d 160 (1965). 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion it is respectfully submitted that this 
appeal sets forth the corollary to the long standing rule 
fullowed by this Court, that it will not reverse the findings 
Gnd rulings of the trial court unless there is no substantial 
evidence to support them or they are clearly against the weight 
of the evidence. 
From the facts adduced at trial, and in the court's 
own comments, the evidence is weighed heavily in the plaintiff's 
favor. To thereafter rule in the defendant's favor would require 
the court to ignore the evidence or misapply the recognized facts, 
and clearly there is no substantial evidence to support its final 
ruling. 
The lower court erred in finding no cause of action and 
this Court is respectfully requested to reverse that ruling and 
enter judgment in favor of the plaintiff. 
-9-
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Richard B. Cualto 
.'\ttorncy for Plaintif£-Apoclbn• 
I hereby certify that I delivered eleven (ll) coples 
of the foregoing Brief to the Utah Supreme Court, State of 
Utah, this day of , 1977. I al~;o 
certify thatldelivcredtwo (2l-copC_,s of the forc9oing Brie' 
t.o Lawrence E. Stevens, PARSONS, BEHLE & LATUlEH, 79 South 
State Street, P.O. Box 11898, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84147, thr 
attorney for defenda.nt-respondent, this _____ da:,• of 
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